A History of Egyptian Politics Part 3
British occupation: AD 1882-1914
The dominant figure during the years of the British occupation of Egypt is Evelyn Baring, a member of a long-established British family of bankers. He first serves in Egypt from 1877 to 1880 as the British member of the commission responsible for coping with the Egyptian debt. After the defeat of Arabi Pasha in 1882, Baring returns as consul general – in effect in charge of the British administration.
Over the next quarter-century Baring (or Lord Cromer, as he is from 1892) places the Egyptian finances on a sound footing and oversees all internal affairs – including the withdrawal from Sudan after Gordon‘s death in 1885 and the return under Kitchener in 1898.
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Cromer’s authoritarian attitudes and his tendency to work only with Egypt’s traditional ruling class (he learns Turkish but not Arabic) put him at odds with the continuing demands of the Egyptian nationalists. By 1907 the British government, in an attempt to liberalize the administration, replaces him with an Arabic-speaking consul general, Eldon Gorst.
But it is events on a wider stage than local nationalism which bring about the next change in Egypt’s political status. The khedive’s sovereign, the Ottoman sultan, is from November 1914 at war with Britain. In December Britain declares that ‘the suzerainty of Turkey is terminated’, and that Egypt is now to be ‘a British protectorate’.
Eight years to independence: AD 1914-1922
At the moment when Britain makes Egypt a protectorate, the khedive (now Abbas II) is away in Constantinople. Being closely linked to the Turkish enemy, he is replaced on the throne by his uncle, Husayn Kamil. Three years later Husayn dies and is succeeded by a younger brother, Fuad.
Egypt is not directly involved in World War I but the defeat of the Axis powers, including Turkey, leads to immediate hopes of independence – particularly after France and Britain declare their commitment in November 1918 to the self-determination of the various peoples liberated from the Ottoman empire.
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On 13 November 1918, within two days of the signing of the armistice, a political party is formed in Cairo by Saad Zaghlul. It is named Wafd, short for Al-Wafd al-Misri and meaning the Egyptian Delegation. The name reveals the immediate purpose – to send to the coming peace conference delegates who will voice the demand of the Egyptian people for independence.
This is more than has been envisaged by Britain, which ensures that there is no Egyptian presence at the talks. When the leaders of Wafd react angrily in Cairo, martial law is introduced. Zaghlul and several colleagues are arrested in March 1919 and are deported to Malta. The result is uproar in Egypt, with demonstrations against foreigners in general and the British in particular.
During the next three years the situation remains tense, while it becomes increasingly evident that the nationalist policies of Wafd are shared by a large majority in Egypt. In 1922 Britain proposes immediate independence, with various strings attached. British troops are to remain in Egypt to protect imperial interests (meaning in particular the Suez canal). And the Sudan is left out of any settlement.
Fuad, the sultan, accepts these terms. In March 1922 he becomes Fuad I, king of an independent Egypt. He already has an heir to his throne, the two-year-old prince Farouk.
Throne and Wafd: AD 1922-1939
A constitution providing for parliamentary government is introduced in 1923. Elections in the following year sweep Wafd into power with Zaghlul as prime minister. One of the party’s main principles, the demand for the merging of Egypt and the Sudan, guarantees friction with the British government. And its commitment to constitutional government puts it at loggerheads with the king. Whatever the details of his new constitution, Fuad instinctively inclines to more absolute royal powers.
The issue of the Sudan comes to a head in 1924, when riots and violence by Sudanese nationalists prompt the British government to use force majeure in a unilateral solution. Egyptian forces are evicted from the Sudan.
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A compromise on the Sudan is not found until 1936. During the intervening twelve years the struggle between Wafd and the king continues. Zaghlul dies in 1927 but he is followed at the head of the party by an almost equally forceful leader, Mustafa al-Nahas Pasha.
The conflict between the king and Nahas Pasha (who is determined to curb the royal powers) lasts until the death of Fuad in 1936. It includes one lengthy period (1928-34) when Fuad tears up the constitution of 1923 and rules by decree. Relations are hardly any easier after the young prince Farouk succeeds to the throne.
Early in the new reign Nahas Pasha leads a delegation to London and signs an Anglo-Egyptian treaty which goes some way to easing the tensions between the two countries – at any rate on the topic of the British troops stationed in Egypt and much resented by Wafd.
It is agreed that the number of these troops will be steadily scaled down while Egypt strengthens its own defensive forces, and that they will eventually be limited to the region of the Suez canal. Nothing is settled on the long-term future of the Sudan, but the treaty at least enables Egypt to resume its shared responsibilities after a gap of twelve years.
Wars and revolution: AD 1939-1952
In the run-up to World War II the Italian aggression on either side of Egypt and the Sudan, in Libya and Ethiopia, gives a new sense of unity to British and Egyptian interests. Egypt remains neutral throughout the war, but the British forces – previously so unwelcome – now have the important task of driving back the Italians from both borders.
This responsibility becomes very much greater from 1941, when Rommel and his Afrika Corps join the Italians in a determined drive east towards Egypt. By June 1942 they are within forty miles of Alexandria and seem likely to reach Cairo and the Suez canal, until they are at last held at El Alamein.
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When the field of combat moves north out of Africa in 1943, Egyptian attention begins to focus more locally on Arab affairs. Arab hackles are raised by the summary treatment dealt out to Lebanese nationalists by the French in 1943, while Zionist demands on Palestine are also seen as cause for alarm.
One result is the conference of Arab nations held in Cairo in March 1945. Under the presidency of Nahas Pasha, this results in the formation of the Arab League. Three years later the League has a full-scale war on its hands, as its members attempt to nip the state of Israel in the bud in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.
These postwar years are also a time of increasing anti-British turmoil within Egypt. The relaxation of wartime restrictions in 1945 is followed by a rush of heightened resentment at the continuing presence of British troops on Egyptian soil.
To this there is added a religious and terrorist element in the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, responsible in December 1948 for the assassination of both the Egyptian prime minister (Nokrashi Pasha) and the chief of the Cairo city police. Acts of violence against British forces become increasingly common, until an encounter between British troops and rebels at the police headquarters in Ismailia, in January 1952, results in forty-six Egyptian deaths.
The response, on the following day, is widespread rioting in Cairo and the destruction of numerous buildings and businesses owned by foreigners. There are a few British deaths.
For the next few months Farouk and his government attempt, unsuccessfully, to cope with a deteriorating situation. But the pleasure-loving king, widely regarded as a playboy, is soon deprived of these responsibilities. On the night of 22 July 1952 a group of officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, seizes power in a bloodless coup. Farouk, forced to abdicate, sails into exile on his luxury yacht. He is succeeded by his nine-month-old son as Ahmed Fuad II. But the council of regency soon dispenses with the need for an infant monarch.
Nasser and the Aswan dam: AD 1952-1956
The group which has toppled Farouk is a small secret organization, the Free Officers, founded by Nasser with Anwar el-Sadat and others in the Egyptian army in the 1940s. Their aim is to rid Egypt not only of the monarchy but also of the hated British presence.
After the coup of 1952 Nasser wields the real power behind the scenes. But the government is headed at first by Mohammed Naguib, who becomes president when Egypt is declared a republic in June 1953. Meanwhile political parties have been banned. In 1954 after a brief power struggle (Naguib has a greater following than his colleagues realize), Nasser takes open control.
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He intends to create a non-aligned socialist state occupying a position of leadership in the Arab and Muslim world. But the proximity of Israel makes non-alignment difficult. Israel’s western allies are reluctant to sell arms to Egypt (the Egyptian-Israeli border in Gaza is a dangerous flashpoint), so in 1955 Nasser arranges for a supply of eastern-bloc weapons from Czechoslovakia.
At the same time Nasser is greatly increasing Egypt’s trade with the communist nations (China is by now the main market for Egyptian cotton). Nasser considers these economic links compatible with non-alignment. But soon they jeopardize the great domestic undertaking which he is above all determined to achieve.
Nasser’s pet project is the construction of a high dam at Aswan, to form a massive lake (inevitably Lake Nasser) some 300 miles in length. The dam will control the annual flooding of the Nile, crucial to Egypt’s agriculture, as well as generating vast amounts of electricity.
Early in 1956 Nasser seems able to demonstrate that non-alignment is viable. He secures the offer of loans from the USA and Britain to finance the Aswan dam. But in July of this year the USA withdraws its offer, shortly followed by Britain. Nasser’s response is prompt. Within days he declares that the Suez canal is nationalized. Income from the canal will fund his dam – and there is soon Soviet finance on offer, to offset the rebuff from the west.
Nasser’s seizing of the Suez Canal, in July 1956, is made possible by the success of an agreement which he has negotiated two years earlier with Britain. This has provided for the withdrawal over twenty months of all British troops from the canal zone, thus removing the last cause of Egyptian resentment against British imperialism.
Any cause for resentment is now on the British side. The 99-year lease granted to the Suez Canal Company still has twelve years to run, and Nasser is not proposing to pay compensation. In the short term there is little that can be done about this by Britain or France (the other main shareholder in the company) except make forceful protests at the United Nations.
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During the autumn of 1956 Britain and France build up their forces in the Mediterranean, but the tension escalates abruptly on October 29 when Israeli troops move into the Sinai peninsula, a province of Egypt. Their pretext is provocation from the Egyptians in successive border incidents. But the Suez Canal lies in the path of the invading Israelis, making the issue of immediate international urgency.
Britain and France issue an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt, ordering each to withdraw ten miles from the canal. It is a somewhat one-sided demand. Israel as yet has hardly any troops near the canal, of which Egypt is in full possession. The Israelis accept the ultimatum. Egypt disregards it.
The British and the French, in defiance of the wishes of the UN security council and general assembly, begin bombing Egyptian airfields. On November 5 they land marines and paratroops near Port Said. Egyptian forces on the canal (now blocked with sunken vessels) are soon at a disadvantage. But the occupation is still incomplete when international outrage causes Britain and France, along with Israel and Egypt, to accept a ceasefire at midnight on November 6.
Within weeks UN forces arrive. The French and British withdraw after a disastrous fiasco. Israel gains nothing. Nasser has lost his air force (soon replaced by the USSR), but he has secured his ownership of the canal and has gained immeasurably in local prestige.
Egypt and Israel: AD 1956-1973
Nasser’s standing in the Arab world after the Suez crisis brings him the chance of wider leadership. This soon becomes evident in the 1958 merger of Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic (to be joined a month later by the kingdom of Yemen, to form the United Arab States).
Nasser is the most prominent figure in this unwieldy political unit, which comes to an abrupt end in 1961 when Syria withdraws. Significantly, Nasser continues till the end of his life to use the name United Arab Republic for Egypt on its own (the nation becomes Egypt again in 1971). But at this time leadership of the Arab world means only one thing – leadership of the opposition to Israel.
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While successfully maintaining non-alignment in relation to the power blocs of the Cold War, Nasser is inflexibly antagonistic to his northern neighbour. When hostilities flare up between Israel and Syria in 1967, he is quick to involve Egypt in the escalating crisis.
The Arab side is decisively defeated in the resulting Six Day War, as a result of which Egypt loses both Gaza and the Sinai peninsula (including, at first, even the east bank of the Suez canal). Nasser offers to resign, but he is able to stay in office thanks to vociferous popular demonstrations on his behalf – orchestrated no doubt, but with an undercurrent of genuine enthusiasm.
The war leaves the Suez Canal closed, to the great detriment of Egypt’s finances. Negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal are still under way when Nasser dies of a sudden heart attack in 1970. He is succeeded as president by Anwar el-Sadat.
Sadat at first follows Nasser’s hawkish policy towards Israel, launching with Syria the surprise attack on Israel during the holiday of Yom Kippur in 1973. In this war Egypt recovers some of the Sinai peninsula, becoming the first Arab nation to win territory from the Israelis. This success prompts Sadat to risk a dramatic volte-face. He attempts to lead the Arab world in negotiation with the shared enemy.
In 1977 Sadat takes the unprecedented step of travelling to Jerusalem to propose a peace plan to the Israeli parliament. His advance is well received by another politician who has been equally hardline in the past, Menachem Begin. Together the two leaders enter a process of negotiation which leads to a peace treaty between their two nations, signed at Camp David in 1978.
But in this important achievement Sadat has moved too far ahead of majority Arab opinion, and in particular of Muslim sentiment.
Fundamentalist Muslims have long been disenchanted with the Egyptian leadership. In 1954 an assassination attempt on Nasser is traced to the Muslim Brotherhood, which as a result is forcefully suppressed (putting an end to the only organized opposition group in Egypt).
Now, in the early 1980s, the peace treaty with Israel revives Muslim opposition – which in its turn provokes repressive measures by Sadat’s government. In October 1981 the peacemaker pays with his life. At a military parade to commemorate the war of 1973 Anwar el-Sadat, reviewing the march past from the podium, is gunned down by Muslim terrorists.
Mubarak: from AD 1981
Sadat is peacefully succeeded by his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, who in broad terms follows the same policies – keeping to the terms of Camp David, and thus ensuring the agreed return of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt in April 1982.
Relations with Israel take a temporary turn for the worse two years later as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, but by the 1990s Mubarak is again following Sadat’s example. He becomes the most prominent peacemaker in the middle east, restoring Egypt’s position of leadership in the Arab world. He is helped in this role by his own enhanced status in the west – the result of Egypt’s role in the Gulf War.
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In 1994 Mubarak is the broker in peace moves between Israel and the PLO. In 1995 he hosts a summit in Cairo attended by Yitzhak Rabin, King Hussein and Yasser Arafat. But as with Sadat, these initiatives do not endear him to Muslim fundamentalists.
During the 1990s Muslim terrorism becomes an increasing problem for Egypt, severely harming the nation’s crucial income from tourism. A prolonged campaign of violence begins in March 1992, leading to some 200 deaths in the following eighteen months. During the decade there are several attempts on Mubarak’s life. The most damaging incident in terms of Egypt’s economy is the killing in 1997 of some sixty tourists on a visit to the famous funerary temple of Queen Hatshepsut.
From the start the government reacts vigorously, introducing martial law and eventually imprisoning some 20,000 militants. The largest and oldest fundamentalist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, is by now a mainstream movement (though still officially banned) with followers at all levels of society. The premises of Muslim Brotherhood lawyers and other professionals are frequently raided and their occupants arrested, on suspicion of being linked to groups engaged in terrorism.
There are several such groups. One is al-Jihad, responsible for the 1981 assassination of Sadat. The largest and most active is the Islamic Group (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya), which perpetrated the massacre at the Hatshepsut temple.
There are other causes of tension within contemporary Egypt. The Coptic Christians, amounting to some 10% of the population, feel ill-served by the government (as well as frequently suffering Muslim terrorist attacks). And the prevailing end-of-century demand for democracy gets short shrift.
From the early 1990s, as in many other African nations, the ban on political parties is relaxed. But Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (a development of Nasser’s original Free Officers) contrives to keep a firm grip on power. In 1993 Mubarak is the only presidental candidate, winning a third six-year term. In elections in 1995, widely regarded as fraudulent, his party secures 93% of the seats.
What happens after Mubarak?
